Hastings Women’s Law Journal
Volume 14
Number 2 Summer 2003

Article 3

7-1-2003

The Many Ways to Prove Discrimination
Vikram David Amar

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj
Recommended Citation
Vikram David Amar, The Many Ways to Prove Discrimination, 14 Hastings Women's L.J. 171 (2003).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj/vol14/iss2/3

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Women’s Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

The Many Ways to Prove Discrimination
A Book Review by Vikram David Amar *
For those who believe the debate concerning anti-discrimination law
and policy has become stale, Ian Ayres' book, Pervasive Prejudice?:
Unconventional Evidence of Race and Gender Discrimination, is a breath
of fresh air. I As the title of the book itself suggests, some of the evidence
Professor Ayres adduces is unusual. But his evidence is not the only thing
that is unconventional- much of Ayres' analysis is new, creative and quite
stimulating. Indeed, for a generalist like me who thinks about antidiscrimination principles as they relate to broader areas of law like
constitutional law, Ayres' analytic frameworks and suggested reforms are
as important as is the powerful empirical documentation of existing
discrimination that he reports.
The book is broken up into three major Parts. Part I involves disparate
treatment on account of race or gender, i.e., situations in which person A
treats person B differently because of person B's race or gender. The raceor gender-consciousness on the part of person A can be either intentional or
subconscious, but either way person B's race and/or gender is influencing
person A's actions.
Professor Ayres focuses on covert disparate treatment in the retail
sector. He properly points out that many people assume that a profit
motive makes disparate racial or gender treatment unlikely in the retail
setting, and he does a good job of analyzing why those assumptions may
not be well founded. More importantly, his work in the first Part begins to
address the large void in existing empirical work, to test whether retail
racial and gender discrimination continue to exist in today's world.
Drawing largely on studies he and others have done in retail car
markets in the Chicago area, Ayres adduces overwhelming evidence that
dealerships consistently and significantly discriminate, in the way they
negotiate terms of a deal, against women and racial minority customers. In
particular, Ayres shows that dealerships offered white males significantly
• Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001). Ian Ayres is the William K. Townsend Professor of Law
at Yale Law School.
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lower prices than blacks and women. The average prices offered to white
women in the experiments were more than $200 higher than the prices
offered to white men, and the offers to black women were $400 higher than
those given to white men. The offers made to black men were highest of
all, more than $900 higher than the offers made to white men.
The studies' methodologies were simple enough, but meticulous. Pairs
of testers (one of whom was always a white male) were specifically trained
to pursue a uniform bargaining strategy when dealing with the salespeople.
They were then sent out to negotiate for the purchase of new cars at
randomly selected dealerships located throughout the Chicago metropolitan
region. Professor Ayres' objective, of course, was to have the testers differ
only by race and/or gender. In other words, aside from their race and
gender, the testers were to present a uniform appearance and uniform
consumer behavior. All the testers were drawn from the same age range,
had similar educational backgrounds, wore to the dealerships similar
clothing, drove to the dealerships in similar cars, told the dealers they
would self-finance the purchase, told the dealers they had the same
occupations, provided the dealers with addresses in the same
neighborhoods, and even were chosen to be of similar physical
attractiveness. Moreover, each tester was told to focus quickly on a
particular car, elicit an offer by the dealer, wait exactly 5 minutes before
responding with a counteroffer that was slightly more than the dealer's
marginal cost on that car (thus signaling to the dealer a knowledgeable
purchaser) and then see what counteroffer the dealer came back with.
Because the testers were essentially following a scripted course of
negotiating strategy (i.e., the testers were told exactly what price to ask for,
exactly how to respond to counteroffers, etc.), any systematic differences in
the way they were treated by the dealers (Le., the best and final offers made
by the dealers) could be attributed only to race or gender. In short, the
evidence Professor Ayres adduced in this Part is devastating to those who
think women and minorities are not treated worse in the marketplace.
Moreover, because the differential treatment of white men versus other
customers was so pronounced, Professor Ayres argues convincingly that
any other variables that cannot easily be controlled for (such as how often
each tester blinked during the test, or how gracefully each tester sat down
in the driver's seat, etc.) cannot by themselves explain the results. It is
quite clear that race and gender do matter to the dealers.
Why they matter to the dealers is another question altogether. Ayres
speculates about possible causal explanations for the race- and genderconsciousness, ranging from racial animus to "rational" statistical
inferences based upon a profit-maximizing goaL This section of the book
(the chapter entitled "Toward Causal Explanation") is a bit less helpful than
most of the others. While Ayres' deconstruction of possible causal
mechanisms is very intriguing and educational, his bottom line is that 44[i]n
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the end, it may prove impossible to parse out the various elements of
animus and rational inferences from irrational stereotypes.,,2 Ayres may
well be right here (and his evidence does point in conflicting directions),
but if he is correct, then one wonders what to make of his introductory
comment at the beginning of the chapter to the effect that "[0 ]nly with an
accurate understanding of the reasons for dealer behavior can regulators
hope to determine what, if any, governmental intervention might
effectively protect black and/or female customers.,,3 I myself am not
entirely convinced that we do need to know why race and gender are being
used in order to effectively stop them from being used, but if Ayres
believes this, his punch line of indeterminacy comes up a tad short.
The final piece of Part I - Ayres' refutation of the idea that victims can
protect themselves from retail discrimination by selecting their own
bargaining strategies and choosing the dealers they visit - does not come
up short at all. Richard Epstein, for example, has argued that "[i]fblacks or
women know that they are apt to get a good deal. from some small fraction
of the market, then they can avoid other, less receptive dealerships and
their unattractive offers.,,4 As Professor Ayres points out, "[t]he audit tests
themselves provide powerful evidence that African Americans cannot
protect themselves from the effects of discrimination by merely searching
for and shifting their consumption to non discriminating dealers,"s because
one key finding of the studies is that discrimination was pervasive across
all the dealerships tested. Even by avoiding suburban neighborhoods or
dealerships located in areas with very few minorities, African Americans
could not escape the widespread discrimination in the car retail sector.
Moreover, even if (as may be true to some extent) minorities could
reduce (but not eliminate) the effect of discrimination against them by
employing different bargaining strategies than those used by the testers,
forcing minorities to use a particular type of bargaining strategy itself
[R]epresent[ s] an important type of race discrimination. This is
especially true if the alternative path to a good deal [is]
significantly more onerous. If whites need only bargain for four
hours to negotiate a low markup, but blacks must negotiate for
eight hours, then a finding that blacks in equilibrium did not pay
more [than whites] for cars would not mean that blacks were

2. ld. at 85.
3. ld. at 45.
4. ld. at 88; see also Ian Ayres, Alternative Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination Analysis
in Older Market Settings, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 67, 81 (1994) (quoting RICHARD A.
EpSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA nON LAWS 52
(1992)); Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden Ground, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1, 52-53 (1994).
5. AYRES, supra note 1, at 90.
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uninjured by the dealerships' disparate treatment. 6
Part II of Pervasive Prejudice? focuses not on disparate treatment, but
rather on disparate impact, the other major analytic vehicle used by
plaintiffs under the nation's anti-discrimination laws. To make out a claim
of disparate impact, a plaintiff must show that a particular device or
practice by the defendant has an uneven racial or gender effect - a disparate
racial or gender impact - that burdens minorities or women more than
whites or men. Once a disparate impact has been shown, the question
becomes whether the impact is justified by reference to some legitimate
objective the defendant is trying to accomplish that is unrelated to race or
sex bias. If so, the disparate impact is tolerated; if not, the disparate impact
dooms the defendant's practice or device.
Professor Ayres illustrates and documents the disparate impact theory
using two unusual factual backdrops - kidney transplants and bail setting.
As for kidney transplants, Ayres adduces studies to demonstrate that the
federal government's rules for allocating kidney transplants - rules that
focus on antigen matching - disproportionately disqualify potential black
recipients. Such disparate impact, the federal government had traditionally
argued, was the unfortunate but unavoidable side effect of a policy that
otherwise made good medical sense in that antigen matching was the most
reasonable available method for identifying recipients whose bodies were
most likely to physiologically accept (rather than reject) the transplanted
kidneys. It turned out, though, as Professor Ayres demonstrates, that the
antigen point matching system used by the government did not reduce
rejection rates any more than did a modified antigen point system (in which
antigen matching was still relevant but downplayed) that had a much less
pronounced racially disparate impact would have. Thus, Professor Ayres'
studies showed, much of the disparate impact under the original antigen
point system was unjustified by any medical benefits.
As Professor Ayres himself acknowledges, the disparate impact
analysis undertaken in the kidney studies is quite methodologically
conventional - a "traditional empirical approach" that looks at two sets of
data to make out a disparate impact claim: One set of data which
documents the racially disparate impact itself (which shows that absent the
antigen matching program, a higher percentage of blacks would qualify for
transplants); and a second set of data that shows that the impact is not
justified by any medical upside (a study of the antigen matching program
and rejection rates). This conventional analysis is performed by Ayres
quite well - but it is conventional nonetheless. Indeed, the two most
remarkable aspects of the kidney discussion are the compelling real-life
implications of the study, and the fact that the study actually influenced the
federal government to alter its policies to ameliorate the needless disparate
6. Id. at 9l.
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impact. This Part of the book is a helpful reminder to all of us in the
academy that scholarship can influence important policy.
The bail setting study in Part II, by contrast, not only makes for good
real-life drama, but also contains important methodological innovation as
well. Professor Ayres analyzes the bail setting practices used by state
judges in criminal cases in New Haven, Connecticut. As Professor Ayres
explains: "The traditional way to statistically test for discrimination in bail
setting is to estimate in a regression how factors that are both permissible
(that is, related to a defendant's flight risk) and observable (that is, seen by
the judge at the time of bail setting) affect the size of bail, and then to
determine whether, after controlling for these factors, race is still a
significant determinant of the bail amount.,,7 In other words, one looking at
the amount of bail set in all cases would try to control for things like how
serious the alleged crime is, whether the defendant had ever fled before,
whether the defendant has a job, etc., and inquire whether - after all these
factors are held constant - there is still a racially disparate impact, i.e.,
within each small group of defendants who share all relevant
characteristics, bail rates set for blacks are higher.
The problem with this traditional approach - and it is a problem for all
traditional disparate impact methodology is that critics will always charge
that some important factor was not adequately controlled for. For example,
in the hypothetical above, someone might say, "You didn't control for
whether a defendant had family in the area something a judge could
legitimately take into account in setting bail - and the fact that blacks in
your study had higher bail rates may just mean they had fewer family
members in the area." Ayres refers to this problem as the "omitted
This methodological difficulty has made it
variable" problem.
"exceedingly difficult to use regression analysis to demonstrate racial
discrimination. ,,8
To get around this problem, Ayres makes use in the bail arena of what
he calls an "outcome test." Rather than focusing on the bond amounts set
for blacks to see if they are higher (which they are, but perhaps for reasons
unrelated to race), Ayres focuses on the outcomes of the bond setting - the
actual flight rates. 9 If, at the end of the day, bail bond setting decisions
7. Jd. at 238.
8. Jd. at 239.

This omitted variable problem can plague some disparate treatment
methodology as well. For example, critics who disbelieve the auto dealer tests described
earlier may claim that some important tester variable, such as whether the tester seemed
confident or not, was omitted from the testing methodology.
9. Actually, Ayres says there is no clear empirical data as to real flight rates broken
down by race, so Ayres uses what he says is the next best thing - the prices charged by bail
bondsmen to black and white defendants. Because the bail bondsman market functions
well, prices charged by bail bondsmen should correspond to the flight risks and rates
presented by various groups of defendants. Ayres points out that bail bondsmen effectively
charge less to black than to white defendants, which means that the bail amounts set for
blacks are unjustifiably high.
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produce higher court appearance rates for minority defendants than for
whites (that is to say, a higher percentage of whites on bail flee and forfeit
the bond), then we may infer that the bond setting decisions have an
unjustified disparate impact on minority defendants. Ayres' data indicates
that bail reduced the probability of flight for minority defendants below the
flight probability for white defendants. In other words, judges are setting
bail rates so as to demand a lower probability of flight for minorities than
for whites - they are setting bail in such a way as to tolerate more white
flight than black flight.
As I will explain below, this "outcome test" methodology is quite
interesting and potentially quite powerful. This feature alone quite literally
makes Part II a must-read.
Part III of the book discusses affirmative action, or at least a particular
kind of affirmative action: Programs by the federal government that give
women- and minority-owned broadcasting stations a major subsidy in the
competitive bidding auction process for licenses allocated by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). In particular, minority- or womenowned businesses are required to pay about only half of what they bid in
order to obtain the licenses in the auction. The FCC's objective, in making
race and gender relevant, is to increase broadcast diversity; the race or sex
of the license owner may affect the content of the programming aired under
the license.
In addition to being attacked as "reverse discrimination," such
programs have been criticized as huge giveaways of federal resources.
Counter-intuitively enough, Professor Ayres in this Part of the book
demonstrates that the overall revenue to the federal government for the sale
of the licenses increased by more than 12% under the minority- and
women-owned business preference program.
As Ayres explains, "[a]lthough at first blush it seems that allowing
designated bidders to pay fifty cents on the dollar would necessarily reduce
the government's revenue,,,IO in fact subsidizing some bidders created extra
competition in the auction and drove up the successful bid prices for the
remaining, unsubsidized, slots. The unsubsidized firms bid more than they
would have absent the subsidy program because there were fewer licenses
for which they could actually compete (once the subsidy effectively set
aside a number of licenses for women and minorities).
Two points about Professor Ayres' affirmative action parable bear
quick mention. First (as he acknowledges), the phenomenon he describes
would occur if any slots were effectively set aside for any group of
applicants - the fact that the subsidy was allotted on the basis of race and
gender was irrelevant to the auction effect he describes. Second, a desire to
increase revenue could not, by itself, ever justify government race
10. AYRES,

supra note 1, at 316.
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consciousness, and Professor Ayres never suggests otherwise.
Nonetheless, his surprising economic punch line about affirmative action
provides, as I suggest below, a lot offood for thought.
Making one's way through the detail of the three Parts of the book is
no mean feat Let me be clear. The book is quite carefully and well
written. But it nevertheless does demand a lot of attention and a fair level
of sophistication on the part of the reader. The subject matter is
complicated, and some of the ideas are nuanced. A background in, or at
least a feel for, basic microeconomic reasoning and statistical analysis
definitely helps. So too does a familiarity with the fundamental framework
of anti-discrimination law. The people (both lawyers and non-lawyers)
who will derive the most from the book are people who like to think hard
as they read, and who don't mind stopping every five pages or so to reflect
upon what they have just read.
But if you are that kind of person, you will surely benefit from reading
this book. The different kinds of proofs of discrimination are interesting in
themselves. In fact, Professor Ayres proves race- or gender-consciousness
in many different ways: He focuses on the overt text of some policies (like
the FCC's); he employs testers to demonstrate disparate treatment; he uses
traditional multi-variable regression analysis to examine unjustified
disparate impact; he devises "outcome tests" to uncover other unjustified
disparate impacts, and he also makes use of "principal audits" - a device
whereby an agent who is discriminating on behalf of a principal can be
induced into admitting the discriminatory instructions given by the
principal.
It is where the book goes, prescriptively, however, that makes it even
more deeply worthwhile. In the few pages I have here I can't come close
to doing justice to this aspect of the book, but let me raise a few
possibilities.

IMPLICAnONS
One big suggestion Professor Ayres makes is to extend antidiscrimination law to protect against gender-consciousness in the retail
sector. Professor Ayres correctly points out that housing, education and
employment - and not retail sales - have been the primary domain of antidiscrimination statutes. Moreover, one of the major federal statutes that
may reach retail sales - section 1981, which prohibits discrimination in the
making and enforcing of contracts - speaks only to race and not to gender.
I think Professor Ayres is undoubtedly correct that extension of antidiscrimination laws in the ways he suggests is a step in the right direction.
But will such extension do much? That, of course, depends upon the ease
with which the rights embodied in any extension of law can be vindicated
in courts.
To address that enforcement problem, Professor Ayres encourages
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broader use of the kind of tester studies he utilized in the Chicago auto
dealerships. Like the extension of the laws themselves, an increase in the
number of well-designed testing studies is undeniably a good thing.!! But
even these studies are going to be of limited use in actual court cases, for a
few reasons.
First, as Professor Ayres concedes, many testing studies will be
criticized for not adequately constraining the discretionary conduct of the
testers. If two testers are not in all relevant respects absolutely identical
(except for race and/or gender), then a defendant who treats them
differently might not be doing so because of race- or gender-consciousness.
Second, as Professor Ayres hints but does not thoroughly discuss, a
plaintiff who is not a tester (but rather who is a bona fide woman or
minority customer) may have difficulty using even a well-designed test to
prove that slbe was discriminated against. Just because a defendant
discriminated against black or women testers does not mean slbe
discriminated against a non-tester black or woman plaintiff. A non-tester
plaintiff who, say, was offered a car deal slbe didn't like cannot point to a
white or male who necessarily got a better deal for the same car on the
exact same day, etc.
One way around this dilemma for a plaintiff would be, as Ayres
suggests, to use a pattern or practice class action device. But such devices,
whereby statistical evidence of a pattern of discrimination can be used by
any plaintiff who is a member of the same racial or gender group, is quite
constrained. 12
Finally, even if a pattern or practice class action or other device
enabled an individual non-tester plaintiff to use the pattern or practice of
discrimination established by the test, such a device would be available
only against actual retailers who had been tested and failed. A pattern or
practice of discrimination by one retailer surely couldn't be used to prove
discrimination against another retailer who happens to sell the same kinds
of goods or services. And because each test is complicated to.design and
expensive to administer, even a significant expansion of testing will not
result in very many retailers being snagged.13
II. Professor Ayres does note, however, that there may be ethical considerations that
limit some kinds of tester studies. See id. at 40l.
12. For example, in a case that Ayres mentions, McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987),
the Supreme Court did not allow a criminal defendant to use statistical evidence of race
discrimination by juries in general to prove that his jury acted discriminatorily. Id. at 294.
In so deciding, the Court said that every jury is different and that juries act for many
different reasons. Id. The Court also said that employment was one of the few areas where
statistical evidence should be allowed. Id I suspect that the retail sector could easily be
analogized to the employment sector, and distinguished from the criminal procedure setting,
but these are questions Professor Ayres' suggestions raise but do not answer. See AYRES,
supra note 1, at 239.
13. It is possible, of course, that if more testing were done, the fear of being tested and
caught would deter large numbers of retailers from violating the law in the way that, say, the
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The difficulty of proving disparate treatment leads Ayres to suggest
that perhaps more anti-discrimination laws be styled so as to make
disparate impact actionable. For example, Professor Ayres suggests that a
retailer's decision to allow its salespeople to negotiate at all might have a
disparate impact along racial and gender lines, which should cause us to
ask whether much is really served by permitting negotiation to take place.
Do retailers really need to be able to negotiate, or instead should they be
encouraged (or perhaps, as Ayres suggests, required by regulation) to
abandon negotiation discretion and move to the Saturn car model for
pricing?
Ayres' discussion here, like his discussion elsewhere, prompts a lot of
thoughts. My own thoughts here drifted to the similar question being
waged in the affirmative action debate pending in the Supreme Court. In
papers filed in the current University· of Michigan cases,14 the Solicitor
General has argued that the university's affirmative action program is not
narrowly tailored, and thus not constitutional, because there were "race
neutral" alternatives that the university should have pursued, but did not.
In particular, Michigan should, the Solicitor General says, have made use
of plans like those in effect in California or Texas, where admissions
criteria that have racially disparate impacts, like SAT scores, are deemphasized so that more people of color are admitted. I have written
elsewhere that such plans, which sacrifice criteria that schools otherwise
believe contribute to academic excellence, may not be the best idea in the
world. IS
The question there is analytically similar to the question here: What do
we lose by abandoning a practice that has a disparate impact? I admit that
my instincts about what we lose when we change admissions criteria differ
from my intuitions about how much is lost when we get rid of automobile
negotiations, but these divergent gut senses may be due to the fact that I
make my living in education rather than in the car marketplace. Certainly
the abstract question of whether negotiation itself has any social or
economic utility is a large one that Professor Ayres only begins to explore
in this book.
Since I just mentioned the University of Michigan cases, this is a good
place to make note of another thought Professor Ayres' intriguing analysis
triggered concerning educational affirmative action. Professor Ayres
shows how government revenue actually went up because of the FCC
Securities and Exchange Commission uses high-profile prosecutions to ensure more general
compliance.
14. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.), cert granted 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000), cert. granted 123 S. Ct. 602
(2002).
15. Vikram D. Amar, The Bush Administration and the Supreme Court's Michigan
Affirmative Action Cases: Narrow Tailoring and Alternative Methods of Ensuring Diversity
(Feb. 7,2003), at http://writ.news.find1aw.com/amar/20030207.html.
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license set-aside programs.
I wonder whether perhaps race-based
affirmative action in education has had a similar effect. In other words, are
the grades and scores of the white admittees higher today than they were
before race-based affirmative action, because there are fewer (nonaffirmative action) slots to compete for than there used to be?16 Of course,
a company can increase the· size of its bid for a license so long as it has
money, whereas presumably a white university applicant doesn't have an
unlimited capacity to increase his grades or scores. But to the extent that
many students don't always push themselves to perform to the full extent
of their capabilities, the question should be asked: Has affirmative action
actually increased the overall academic quality of student bodies (putting
aside the quite real but hard-to-quantify benefit that comes from diversity
itself) by ratcheting up the competition (and thus the work ethic) among
white applicants? I'd love to see Professor Ayres take up that empirical
question.
Finally, I have a few thoughts/questions about Professor Ayres'
extremely important idea that "outcome tests" should be employed more in
anti-discrimination law. As Professor Ayres summarizes, "[t]he basic idea
of the outcome test is to analyze whether the outcomes (about which the
decisionmaker cares) are systematically different for minorities and
nonminorities.,,17 Professor Ayres correctly identifies the main virtue of
such an approach - its elimination of the "omitted variable" problem that
plagues traditional regression analysis in disparate impact and disparate
treatment cases. By focusing on one set of data - the outcome success rates
we avoid quarrels about whether we have controlled for all other relevant
variables in doing the regression analysis to see if the seemingly disparate
treatment can be explained or the disparate impact justified. The New
Haven bail setting case is a great example. If judges are setting bail
amounts that seem to do their job less effectively for whites than for blacks,
judges must unjustifiably be concerned more with black flight than white
flight.
Professor Ayres identifies a few limitations on the use of outcome
tests; they may not always catch discrimination that does exist because of
the so-called "inframarginality problem" and they may sometimes falsely
suggest improper discrimination because of something called the
"subgroup validity problem.,,18
I believe, however, that there is a related, but larger limitation, on the
outcome test approach, namely, that it works only when we all agree that
16. Even if slots aren't formally reserved for minorities (as the Bakke decision says they
cannot be), the competition between non-minorities for admission heats up whenever there
is race-based affirmative action. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 483 U.S. 265
(1978).
17 . AYRES, supra note 1, at 404.
18. ld. at 408, 412.
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there is only one main objective that the decisionmaker is trying to
accomplish, and we can therefore test the outcome by reference to that
objective. For example, in the bail setting context, we infer that the judges'
differential bail rates for whites and blacks are unjustified only because we
agree that the only thing bail is supposed to do is deter flight, and because
we have racially-disparate flight rates. But the more objectives the
decisionmaker is trying to accomplish, the more outcomes we must
examine, and the more an outcome test begins to suffer the problems of a
multiple regression analysis.
To see this, consider the following
outcome findings that Ayres
says may indicate racial problems: 19

two

1. If editorial acceptance decisions produce higher citation rates for
articles written by minorities than by whites, we might infer that
acceptance decisions have an unjustified disparate impact in
excluding qualified minority articles; and
2. If police search decisions are systematically less productive in
yielding evidence with regard to minorities than with regard to
whites, we might infer that search decisions have an unjustified
disparate impact in subjecting undeserving minorities to being
searched.
Both of these assertions are plausible if, but only if, we believe that the
decisionmaker in each case had a single objective whose outcome success
can be easily measured. 20 In the editorial illustration, for instance, suppose
the editor of the journal cares about more than how many times the articles
he accepts are cited. Suppose he cares about where they are cited, and by
whom they are cited, and for how many years in the future they are cited,
etc. It may be that minority-authored articles are cited more often, but in
less well-regarded journals, and by less prominent academics, etc.
More provocatively, suppose the editor wants the pieces he publishes
to be cited by other scholars who do not personally know the cited authors,
and suppose further that minority scholars are a relatively closely knit
group, who keep in better touch with each other than non-minority
scholars. It might be, then, that minority scholars are being cited more by
other minority scholars (some of whom they know), but are being cited less
by scholars whom they do not personally knoW. 21
19. These examples are drawn verbatim from Ayres. See id. at 405-06.
20. I am struck here by an analogy to constitutional law equal protection rationality
review, and the problem of calling a law "irrational" when it is designed to achieve multiple
purposes. See Vikram D. Amar, Some Questions About Perfectionist Rationality Review, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1994); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82
YALE LJ. 123 (I 972).
21. In the same vein, if the bail bondsmen in Professor Ayres' studies had been offering
lower rates to black defendants because of personal acquaintance, or because the bondsmen
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In the search and seizure context, suppose police conduct searches not
only to yield evidence, but to let criminals suspected of certain crimes
know that they are being watched as well. Suppose police conduct many
searches of suspected drug dealers in part because they want to shake up
drug dealers, even if the police themselves are not always confident that
their searches will tum up anything. 22 In other words, it might be that
police do not search each and every time they have satisfied some
minimum "probable cause" Fourth Amendment threshold, but rather
choose to search only a subset of searchees as to whom they have probable
cause, and make that choice taking into account the crimes for which the
individuals are suspected. If minorities are overrepresented among drug
dealers, then searches of minorities are going to be "less productive" than
searches of whites, even if there is no race consciousness (i.e., even if
police are not setting different thresholds for conducting searches based on
race), and even if there are good policy reasons (i.e., keeping drug dealers
on edge) to justify the disparate impact. 23
To see my point from another perspective, imagine that Asian law
students have lower law school GPAs than white law students. Under an
outcome test reasoning, someone might try to infer that either the school is
taking race into account at the admissions stage against white applicants, or
that white applicants are suffering an unjustified disparate impact by some
aspect of the admissions criteria. 24 To my mind, such an inference would
be unwarranted. Perhaps the school is making a concerted effort to have
more science majors, because it wants to build a strong alumni network in
the law and technology and intellectual property areas. And perhaps
Asians are overrepresented among science major law school applicants
(which may well be, at least in some states). If you suppose further (as also
may be the case) that science majors might have lower law school GPAs
than their non-science counterparts (perhaps because they have less
experience writing essays), then the outcome we observe is neither the
product of race consciousness, nor is it unjustified. But the outcome test
failed to work here because law school grades are not the only outcomes

themselves were engaging in race-based affirmative action to help defendants of color (as
opposed to being driven by a profit motive), the outcome test methodology would have been
less powerful.
22. Let us assume, of course, that such searches - designed to keep criminals off guard
and not just to gather evidence - are not umeasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
23. Professor Ayres himself uses the drug dealer context to illustrate his "subgroup
'validity" problem. While related, this problem is, I think:, distinct from the "multiple
purpose" problem I am raising here.
24. There is, of course, the possibility that Asian law students are themselves being
victimized in law school grading by disparate treatment (which would be unlikely because
of blind grading) or by an unjustified disparate impact in grading criteria. But for purposes
of my hypothetical, let us assume neither of those is true.
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about which law schools can and do legitimately care. 25
If I keep coming back to the educational affirmative action setting, it is
only because that is the great anti-discrimination question of the day. And
it is a good sign that although Professor Ayres' book does not specifically
address the topic at any length, his ideas are extremely relevant to this
momentous question. That kind of universal thought-provocation is, I
would say, a sign of classic work.

25. Again, this is why a context in which only one outcome is relevant to the decision
maker - like bail setting - is the best illustration for Professor Ayres of the power of the
outcome test idea.
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